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A number of theoretical results have provided sufficient conditions for the selec-
tion of payoff-efficient equilibria in games played on networks when agents imitate
successful neighbors and make occasional mistakes (stochastic stability). However,
those results only guarantee full convergence in the long-run, which might be too re-
strictive in reality. Here we employ a more gradual approach relying on agent-based
simulations avoiding the double-limit underlying these analytical results. We focus
on the circular-city model, for which a sufficient condition on the population size
relative to the neighborhood size was identified in Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer
(2006). Using more than 100,000 agent-based simulations, we find that selection
of the efficient equilibrium prevails also for a large set of parameters violating the
previously identified condition. Interestingly, the extent to which efficiency obtains
decreases gradually as one moves away from the boundary of this condition.
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One of the milestones of the literature on learning in games is the result that risk-
dominant equilibria are selected in the long run (even in the presence of alternative,
Pareto-efficient ones) when agents follow simple behavioral rules and make mistakes
(Kandori et al., 1993). This result, however, crucially depends on the assumption that
every player interacts with every other player in the population (global interactions).
Starting with the seminal paper of Ellison (1993) on best-reply behavioral rules and
the circular-city model, the importance of the interaction structure (often referred to as
network) has received considerable attention. Ellison (2000) and Morris (2000) examined
equilibrium selection in networks when agents follow myopic best reply, and found results
in line with the selection of risk-dominant equilibria or suitable generalizations, although
other work (Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2007) has shown that this basic message
cannot be generalized beyond the case of 2× 2 games.
Since risk-dominant equilibria are not necessarily payoff-dominant, those results show
that best-reply rules, which focus only on individual maximization, can generally result
in inefficient outcomes. In contrast, a number of results have shown that, if agents fol-
low imitation rules, which are comparatively simpler but use payoff information from
other agents, payoff-dominant equilibria play a more important role. Robson and Vega-
Redondo (1996) showed that, if agents imitate best observed payoffs but interact with
only one randomly sampled other agent per period (instead of focusing on average pay-
offs across a large number of interactions as in Kandori et al., 1993), payoff-dominant
equilibria are selected. Even though this is a global-interactions model, the result al-
ready highlights the importance of the reach of interactions for equilibrium selection.
Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) showed that, if agents have access to information
slightly beyond their interaction neighborhoods, payoff-dominant equilibria are selected
in arbitrary networks as long as the network size is large enough relative to the (smallest)
size of neighborhoods, a result which survives independently of the size of the game. A
similar result was obtained for minimum-effort games in Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer
(2014).1
In this work, we concentrate on imitation rules in the absence of informational
spillovers, a case which, surprisingly, is still far from settled. Alós-Ferrer and Weiden-
holzer (2006) studied agents using an imitate-the-best rule playing a 2× 2 coordination
game under local information and asked whether risk-dominant or efficient conventions
would be selected. The answer depends on the interaction radius of the agents, i.e. on
“how local” interactions are. Specifically, that work considers a circular city and shows
that the risk-dominant outcome is the unique long-run equilibrium if agents only interact
1Payoff-dominant equilibria can also be selected in some models of interaction through best-reply
rules, but, intuitively speaking, only if an additional dimension of behavior allows to avoid undesirable
interactions. For instance, Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) studied a model of endogenous network
formation where players can build and severe costly links, and showed that coordination on the payoff-
dominant one occurs if links are costly enough.
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with their direct neighbors. However, if their interaction radius is larger, the efficient
equilibrium is uniquely selected if the population is relatively large compared to the
interaction radius (a condition conceptually aligned with the results in Alós-Ferrer and
Weidenholzer, 2008, 2014).2
The circular city remains a theoretically important benchmark, where the interac-
tion radius neatly captures the idea that interactions can be neither purely local nor
completely global. In this setting, the result of Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006)
remains the theoretical state of the art, but it has two limitations that we address
here. First, it identifies a sufficient condition, and hence the question of whether payoff-
efficient or risk-dominant outcomes are selected when that condition is violated remains
open. Second, the selection result, as standard in the stochastic stability literature,
only addresses convergence in the long-run, which entails a double limit with vanishing
mistakes as time goes to infinity. As a consequence, the identified conditions might be
unrealistically restrictive, and the result refers only to full convergence. Here we adopt
a gradual approach based on extensive agent-based simulations, as in, e.g., Alós-Ferrer
and Buckenmaier (2017) and Khan et al. (2016). Our computational results show that
the extent to which convergence obtains exhibits no sharp discontinuity at the boundary
describing the previously-identified, sufficient condition, but instead changes continu-
ously. The intuition for this result is simple. As the relative network size decreases,
crossing the theoretical boundary from above in the parameter space, transitions toward
the payoff-efficient equilibrium become increasingly difficult, whereas transitions toward
the risk-dominant equilibrium become easier. Despite this continuity, we find that the
process spends relatively more time at the payoff-efficient equilibrium. In this sense,
our results show that “selection” of the efficient equilibrium obtains for a larger set of
parameters than that covered by the theoretical result.
The joint parameter space describing games, networks, and behavioral noise is stag-
geringly large. A full-factorial approach is not feasible in practice at this point. Hence,
we conduct two types of simulations. In Study 1, we run 60,000 simulations with a ran-
dom sampling approach, where the parameters of each simulation are randomly drawn
from the full space with some suitable distributional conditions. In Study 2, and as a
robustness check, we run a factorial design for a reduced number of values (covering 36
games), for a total of 44,100 additional simulations. The results of both studies are in
agreement.
Section 2 below describes the setting. Section 3 describes the main set of simulations
(Study 1) and the results of the analysis. Section 4 presents additional robustness
analyses, including the results of Study 2. Section 5 concludes.
2The model of Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) was revisited by Chen et al. (2012) for the case
where risk-dominant equilibria are also payoff-dominant. The authors find that risk-dominant but also
other equilibria can be selected when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.
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2 The model
The notation follows Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006, 2008). Consider the classical
problem of selection between a risk-dominant (R) and a Pareto-efficient (P ) action in a
2× 2 coordination game with payoff function π given by
P R
P 1, 1 0, α
R α, 0 β, β
where 0 < α < 1 and β < 1 so that both (P,P ) and (R,R) are strict Nash equilibria.
Further, assume that α+ β > 1, that is, (R,R) is risk dominant.
There is a population of N players arranged on a circle so that the immediate neigh-
bors of a player i are i − 1 and i + 1 (modulo N). Players play the game against
their 2k closest neighbors with k ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊N2 ⌋}. The neighborhood of player i is
K(i) = {i − k, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , i + k} for k 6= ⌊N2 ⌋ and K(i) = N \ {i} for k = ⌊
N
2 ⌋.
The latter corresponds to global interactions. Given a strategy profile ω = (si)i∈N the




j∈K(i) π(si, sj). Players observe the actions and
payoffs received by themselves and their neighbors. They follow an imitate-the-best rule





i = sj with j ∈ K(i) ∪ {i}, Πj(ω) ≥ Πl(ω) ∀l ∈ K(i) ∪ {i}}.
This defines a dynamic adjustment process described by a Markov process in discrete
time. In addition, players might make mistakes with a given probability ε > 0. The
stochastically stable states are the long-run equilibria of the process as noise vanishes
(ε −→ 0).
Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006, Theorem 1) show that for k = 1 the risk-
dominant outcome is the unique long-run equilibrium. In contrast, their main result
(Theorem 2) states that for k > 1 the efficient equilibrium is uniquely selected if the
population is relatively large compared to the size of neighborhoods, provided neighbor-
hoods are not too small.
Theorem 2 (Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2006). In the 2k-neighbor model coordina-
tion on the efficient strategy is the unique long-run equilibrium under the imitate-the-best
rule whenever
N > 2k(2k + 1) (1)
provided k ≥ 12−2α (if α > β) or k ≥
1
2−(α+β) (if α ≤ β).
In this work we rely on extensive simulations to study the tightness of the “large
population” condition (1) in a setting with small but non-vanishing noise. Our analysis
will also show the extent to which convergence obtains as one approaches the boundary
of this condition.
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Table 1: Simulation parameters, Study 1.
Type of Simulation Parameter Values
All N N ∼ U({4, . . . , 100})
k k ∼ min{γ(2, N/16), ⌊N2 ⌋}
ε ε ∼ U([0.01, 0.1])
α > β α α ∼ U((12 ,
3
4 ])
β β ∼ U((12 , α))
α ≤ β β β ∼ U((12 ,
3
4 ])
α α ∼ U([12 , β])
Notes: U(S) denotes the uniform distribution over S ⊆ R. γ(a, b) denotes the gamma distribution with
shape parameter a and rate parameter b. 60,000 simulations were conducted, with randomly-sampled
parameter values.
3 Study 1
The relevant space that we intend to explore is five-dimensional. Networks are char-
acterized by the network size N and the neighborhood size k. Underlying games are
characterized by the payoff parameters α, β. Further, avoiding the double-limit ap-
proach adds the mutation probability ε as a further parameter. Simple computations
show that a truly exhaustive computational analysis of the state space remains unprac-
tical. Hence, in a first study, we adopt a random sampling approach. Each simulation
used a set of randomly-drawn parameters according to Table 1. We conducted 60, 000
simulations, half of them with α > β and half with α ≤ β. In both cases the range of α
and β was chosen such that for k > 1 the second condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied for
all feasible combination of α and β. Further, note that for the chosen range any state
with a cluster of at least 2k adjacent players choosing the risk-dominant action lies in
the basin of attraction of R (see Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2006, Lemma 2). That
is, 2k simultaneous mutations are sufficient to leave the state were all players choose P .
3.1 Description of the Simulations
The dynamics described above yields an agent-based simulation protocol as follows.
At time t = 0, we start with a random fraction and distribution of P -players. The
initial profile ω0 = (si)i∈N is obtained assigning si = P or R with probability 0.5 each,
independently for each i. The payoff of player i in period t is Πi(ωt), which determines
the set of “best-performing strategies” Bi(ωt) observed by i. Each player adopts a
strategy si ∈ Bi(ωt), breaking ties randomly if needed. Further, with a fixed probability
ε, player i makes a mistake and chooses s′i 6= si instead of si (independently drawn for
each player). This process is then repeated for T = 200, 000 periods.
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3.2 Results
The objective of the simulations was to obtain estimates of the (limit) invariant distri-
bution µ∗, which determines the long-run equilibria of the dynamics (see, e.g., Ellison,
2000). We rely on the Ergodic Theorem (Karlin and Taylor, 1975) to obtain an approx-
imation of µ∗ through the average time spent by the system in a given state for (long
enough) simulations (as in Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2017). Formally, µ∗ is a dis-
tribution over the set of absorbing states Ω ⊆ {P,R}N . The monomorphic states P̄ and
R̄ in which all players choose P or R, respectively, are always absorbing for imitation-
based dynamics. However, there might be other, non-monomorphic, absorbing states.
Since we are interested in whether coordination on P or R occurs, we focus on the two
monomorphic states and aggregate all non-monomorphic states (absorbing or not) in a
residual, denoted res . Specifically, for each simulation we record the fraction of time
spent in each monomorphic state. Our main output is then the relative probability
distribution f : {P̄ , R̄} ∪ {res} −→ [0, 1]. To control for mechanical differences in the
amount of time spent in non-monomorphic states (e.g. due to different values of ǫ rela-
tive to N), we focus on the restriction of the relative frequency distribution to {P̄ , R̄},
which we denote by F : {P̄ , R̄} −→ [0, 1]. That is, we consider the relative frequency of
monomorphic states normalized by the joint frequency of all monomorphic states.
Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) study selection by analytically identifying the
support of the limit invariant distribution. In contrast, we consider selection in a nu-
merical sense. Specifically, we say that P is (numerically) selected if (empirically) the
process spends relatively more time at P̄ than at R̄, that is, if F (P̄ ) ≥ F (R̄). Selection
of R is defined analogously.
Figure 1 shows a heatmap of the data set in the (k,N)-parameter space. The average
value of F (P̄ ) for each (k,N) pair is color-coded. The dashed line depicts the boundary
given by condition (1). Blank cells are those where there is no data (which is possible
due to random sampling). The figure illustrates that for k = 1 full coordination on R
obtains independently of network size (Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2006, Theorem
1). Thus, we empirically confirm the theoretical prediction that for k = 1 the unique
long-run equilibrium is given by R. Since this result is independent of the network size
N , it serves as an important first validation of our approach. For k > 2, in the area
where (1) holds (left of the dashed line), we observe full coordination on P as predicted
by Theorem 2. Again, our results numerically confirm the analytical selection of P in
that area, which provides a second validation that our concept of (numerical) selection in
terms of the relative frequency mirrors the known theoretical results. Interestingly, the
average value of F (P̄ ) is close to 1 for a relatively large area where (1) is violated (right
of the dashed line). Thus, the simulation results indicate that the efficient equilibrium
is selected for a large range of parameters where Theorem 2 remains silent. Generally,
there is no sharp boundary separating high and low average values of F (P̄ ), but instead
we observe a rather continuous (but somewhat noisy) transition from full coordination
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Figure 1: Heatmap of average value of F (P̄ ), Study 1. Color code indicates value of
F (P̄ ) for each (k,N) pair. Dashed line corresponds to condition (1).
on the efficient equilibrium to full coordination on the risk-dominant one being more
frequent. This insight cannot be obtained from a standard stochastic-stability analysis,
which only yields binary predictions (whether a state is a long-run equilibrium or not).
Intuitively, this gradual relation should not come as a surprise. The Radius-Coradius
result underlying Theorem 2 implies that leaving the basin of attraction of P̄ requires
at least N2k+1 mutations, whereas the basin of attraction of R̄ can be left with no more
than 2k mutations. Hence, it is likely that even below but very close to the boundary
given by N = 2k(2k + 1), most transitions from P̄ to R̄ are still more difficult than
most transitions in the opposite direction. However, the further we move away from this
boundary the more the balance shifts, with R̄ eventually being selected more frequently
than P̄ as N becomes smaller relative to 2k(2k+1). Following this logic, intuitively one
would expect F (P̄ ) to be increasing in N and decreasing in k.
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Table 2: Fractional logit regressions for k > 1, Study 1.
F (P̄ ) 1 2 3 4
LP 2.6196∗∗∗ 1.7737∗∗∗ 3.9950∗∗∗ 1.5748***









|N − 2k(2k + 1)| -0.0007***
(0.0000)
LP × |N − 2k(2k + 1)| 0.0406***
(0.0042)
ε 1.7659∗∗∗ 2.0358∗∗∗ 2.0233∗∗∗ 1.8994***
(0.3728) (0.3919) (0.3925) (0.3815)
Constant 0.4981∗∗∗ 0.3739∗∗∗ 0.3610∗∗∗ 0.7817***
(0.0227) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0243)
Observations 52909 52909 52909 52909
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001.
To confirm these observations and to further study the role of N and k, we turn to a
regression analysis. Since F (P̄ ) is a frequency, we use fractional logit regressions (Papke
and Wooldridge, 2008). Table 2 shows the results of these regressions. For k = 1 full
coordination on R obtains and no gradual effects are expected, hence those observations
are excluded from the regression. As independent variables we include k, N , ε, and a
dummy LP indicating that (1) is fulfilled, that is, LP = 1 if N > 2k(2k + 1), and zero
otherwise.
Model 1 shows that violating (1) significantly decreases the weight on the efficient
equilibrium. In model 2, we include the variables k and N to study how the weight on
P̄ changes as one moves horizontally or vertically, respectively. In line with the general
intuition that increasing k relative to N makes the efficient equilibrium more difficult to
establish, we find a negative effect of k on F (P̄ ) and a positive effect of population size.
That is, coordination on P becomes gradually more difficult as population size decreases
and neighborhood size increases. Model 3 shows that this result is robust when we include
the interactions of k and N with the dummy LP. The direction of the effect of an increase
in N or k within the area covered by Theorem 2 (LP = 1), i.e. as one moves toward the
boundary of (1), is the same. In view of Theorem 2, the interpretation is that long-run
convergence takes longer to obtain as population size decreases and neighborhood size
increases. Finally, we want to link the observed gradual effects of N and k directly to
the tightness of condition (1). To that end, we consider the variable |N − 2k(2k + 1)|,
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which continuously captures the extent to which this condition is satisfied or violated.
Model 4 includes this continuous variable as well as its interaction with LP. When (1)
is violated, moving away from the boundary has a negative effect, whereas the effect is
positive when (1) is satisfied. That is, in line with the above intuition, we find that the
relative weight of the payoff-efficient outcome decreases the smaller N becomes relative
to 2k(2k +1). Finally, we observe a somewhat surprising positive effect of the mutation
probability ε in all specifications. We will return to this point in Section 4.1 below.
4 Robustness Analysis
4.1 Residual and non-monomorphic absorbing states
In the previous section, our analysis relied on the restriction of the relative frequency
distribution to the set of monomorphic states {P̄ , R̄}. However, in a setting with non-
vanishing mutation probability as the one we consider, it is to be expected that the
process also spends a certain amount of time in other absorbing or even non-absorbing
states. To address this issue, we now report several robustness checks using the non-
restricted relative frequency distribution f : {P̄ , R̄} ∪ {res} −→ [0, 1].
We first compare the time spent in monomorphic states relative to the time spent
in other non-monomorphic states. The latter is captured by the weight on the residual
f(res) and contains both absorbing non-monomorphic states and non-absorbing states.
Across all simulations the dynamic spends 36.2% of the time in one of the two monomor-
phic states P̄ or R̄. Naturally, the process should spend less time overall in non-absorbing
states the smaller ǫ is. To test for such a relation, we ran an additional fractional logit re-
gression with dependent variable f(res) that controls for the mutation probability ε. We
find a significant positive effect of ε on the relative weight of the residual (β = 28.8343,
SE: 0.1813, p < 0.0001). Indeed, for the bottom 10% of values of ε the weight on the
residual is on average only 29.9%, whereas it reaches 82.4% on average for the top 10%
of mutation probabilities.
As a further robustness check, we ran analogous regressions to the ones reported in
Table 2 but using the non-restricted relative frequency distribution f instead of F . Note
that for the former distribution the relative weight of R̄ is not simply given by 1− f(P̄ ).
Hence, we report two sets of regressions, one with f(P̄ ) and one with f(R̄) as dependent
variable. Table 3 shows the results of these regressions. Models 1–3 show that the effects
of the dummy LP as well as the effect of the neighborhood size k are qualitatively the
same as the ones reported in Table 2. However, the effect of the network size N in models
2 and 3 is negative, whereas we observed a positive effect of N previously. Note that
since the probability of a mutation is independent across agents, the overall likelihood
of a single mutation is not only increasing in ε but also in N . That is, for larger network
size more weight is shifted to the residual. Hence, in model 4 we additionally control for
the overall frequency of mutations (number of actual mutations in the simulation divided
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Table 3: Fractional logit regressions for k > 1, Study 1.
f(P̄ ) (models 1–4) f(R̄) (models 5–8)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
LP 0.4780∗∗∗ 0.1868∗∗∗ 0.8149∗∗∗ 0.8365∗∗∗ -2.1645∗∗∗ -1.6748∗∗∗ -3.4935∗∗∗ -3.3220∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0328) (0.0279) (0.0626) (0.0631) (0.2562) (0.2559)
k -0.0706∗∗∗ -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0813∗∗∗ 0.0908∗∗∗ 0.0915∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016)
N -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0478∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
LP ×k 0.0313 0.0280∗ 1.0103∗∗∗ 1.0016∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0098) (0.1635) (0.1638)
LP ×N -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0135 -0.0157∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0058) (0.0057)
ε -27.4712∗∗∗ -29.4569∗∗∗ -29.5362∗∗∗ -4.9239∗∗∗ -22.9124∗∗∗ -25.1552∗∗∗ -25.1760∗∗∗ -1.9981∗
(0.2464) (0.2439) (0.2434) (0.5470) (0.4096) (0.3983) (0.3985) (0.7638)
FreqError -0.5522∗∗∗ -0.6244∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant -0.0048 1.4896∗∗∗ 1.4176∗∗∗ 0.2865∗∗∗ -0.8098∗∗∗ 0.8135∗∗∗ 0.8222∗∗∗ -0.2075∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0230) (0.0236) (0.0359) (0.0221) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0468)
Observations 52909 52909 52909 52909 52909 52909 52909 52909
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001.
by the number of periods), which restores a positive effect of N on f(P̄ ) in line with
our previous result. Models 5–8 show the results of the analogous regressions that use
f(R̄) as a dependent variable. Essentially all results mirror the ones obtained for f(P̄ )
but with the opposite sign. Summarizing, the robustness check confirms all our previous
results, which we interpret as confirmatory evidence that the restricted relative frequency
distribution F provides a meaningful summary of the long-run invariant distribution.
Finally, we would like to comment on the role of the mutation probability ε. Recall
that in Table 2 we observed a somewhat surprising, positive effect of ε. However, in
Table 3 we see a clear negative effect of ε on both f(P̄ ) and f(R̄), which is in line with
the intuition that more noise should shift weight from absorbing states to non-absorbing
states in the residual. In light of this result, we view the positive effect of ε on F (P̄ ) as
an indicator that an increase in the mutation probability destabilizes the risk-dominant
equilibrium more that it destabilizes the payoff-efficient equilibrium.
4.2 Non-random sampling: Study 2
Our main goal was to explore the parameter range beyond the set covered by previous
results. To that end, Study 1 relied on simulations with randomly-drawn parameters
for each run. As a consequence, each cell in Figure 1, corresponding to a particular
(N, k) combination, contains a variable number of observations, with different values of
the remaining parameters α, β, and ε. In particular, cells closer to the 45-degree line
contain less observations than those closer to the boundary condition (1), and some cells
contained no data. To address this problem, we ran a second set of simulations following
a full-factorial design for a reduced number of parameter values. Specifically, we fixed six
values for each of the payoff parameters α and β, for a total of 36 games. For each (α, β)
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Table 4: Simulation parameters, Study 2.
Parameter Values
N (even) {4, 6, 8, . . . , 98, 100})
k {1, 2, . . . , (N/2) − 1}
ε 0.1
α {0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75}
β {0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75}
Notes: We use 36 combinations of α and β. For each (α, β) combination there are a total of 1225
combinations of N and k. This yields a total of 36 · 1225 = 44100 simulations.
Figure 2: Heatmap, average value of F (P̄ ), Study 2. Color code indicates value of F (P̄ )
for each (k,N) pair. Dashed line corresponds to condition (1).
combination we then ran 1225 combinations of N and k, covering the same range of N
and k as before but restricting N to even values. We fixed ε = 0.1 for all simulations.
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Table 5: Fractional logit regression for k > 1, Study 2.
F (P̄ ) 1 2 3










Constant -0.6813∗∗∗ -0.1715∗∗∗ -0.1669∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0328) (0.0331)
Observations 42263 42263 42263
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001.
This resulted in 44100 new simulations. Table 4 shows the complete set of parameters
used for Study 2.
Figure 2 shows the heatmap of Study 2’s simulations. Each of the 1125 (N, k) cells
now contains exactly 36 simulations, and all cells share the same 36 (α, β, ε) combina-
tions. In contrast to Figure 1, by construction, there are no empty cells. The number of
cells in the heatmap, however, is reduced by half since N was limited to even numbers.
Again, we observe a smooth gradual pattern, which is less noisy compared to Study 1,
since in Study 2 all cells contain a reasonable number of observations. Overall, the addi-
tional simulations confirm all previous results. Further, they serve as a robustness check
confirming that the observed pattern is not driven by differences in the constellations of
parameters other than N and k between cells. Table 5 displays the analogous regressions
to those in Table 2, confirming our previous conclusions for the new set of simulations.
The only difference is that the interaction terms are not significant.
5 Conclusion
We use extensive agent-based simulations (more than 100,000 simulations in two studies)
to analyze the selection between risk-dominant and Pareto-efficient equilibria in coordi-
nation games played on circular-city networks. Our simulations rely on long but finite
(and bounded) time horizons, and on small but positive error rates (as opposed to the
double-limit approach entailed in any stochastic stability analysis). The results show that
selection of the efficient equilibrium obtains for a larger range of interaction structures
and network sizes than covered by previous results. Further, the degree of convergence
to the efficient equilibrium changes continuously with population and neighborhood size
as one moves beyond the sufficient condition previously identified.
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More specifically, previous theoretical results only established sufficient conditions.
If interactions are not exclusively local, payoff-dominant equilibria are selected provided
a specific condition is satisfied, which ensures that the population size is large enough
with respect to neighborhood size. This condition, however, covers only a small part
of the parameter space. Our results show that the result extends to the entire space
in a gradual way. In other words, if the interactions are not exclusively local, what
determines whether imitation dynamics select predominantly payoff-dominant or risk-
dominant equilibria is the population size relative to neighborhood size. As population
size decreases or neighborhood size increases, the weight of risk-dominant equilibria
increases gradually, compared to payoff-dominant ones. Hence, previous results were
not of an “on/off” nature, but rather an indication of a continuous relationship between
network size and the selection of efficient equilibria.
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